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Abstract
During ethnographic research on HIV-positive pregnant women in Lesotho, I found myself con-
fronted with conflicting narratives, but what we do know is that MaMeli’s baby passed away the 
day after she gave birth in the hospital. Trying to reconstruct what had happened, I interviewed 
the young mother, her mother-in-law, a midwife, and a paediatrician. Their stories differed signifi-
cantly from each other. Yet, despite the inconsistencies between them, they proved valuable for 
my study. Ethnographic storytelling can reveal an informant’s present view on past occurrences 
and give insights into the social roles of narrator and audience. A narration always implies two 
time periods: the past situation as experienced (erzählte Zeit) and the situation now when the 
occurrence is being interpreted (Erzählzeit). Hence, whilst analysing the stories did not bring me 
any closer to understanding what had happened to the baby, an examination of the four versions 
taught me much about each narrator’s present situation and how they related to each other. In 
other words, the different renderings of the event allowed an understanding of the hegemony of 
interpretation. I argue in this paper that contradictions in narratives are more a chance than a 
challenge for ethnographic writing. I call on anthropologists not to erase out inconclusive stories 
in their ethnographic data but to delve into them and to find plausible explanations for why it is 
not possible to achieve conclusive solutions.
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Factual Conflicts and the Hegemony of Interpretation: 
Four Narratives and the Anthropologist’s Version
Lena Kroeker
Introduction
Often anthropological projects conclude their reports to the funding agencies 
by saying that the available time had been too short and the resources too 
little for a topic so complex and that more research was required. The publi-
cations that are prepared on the basis of the data collected, however, present 
only conclusive interpretations: inconclusive, puzzling findings remain un-
mentioned. Publications hardly ever tell about the matters that are left open 
and just did not make sense to the ethnographer. The story of MaMeli, one 
of my key informants, is one such inconclusive case. When writing my PhD 
thesis, I found myself with two options: either to silence her case completely 
or to use it as frame for my methodology chapter, where I could address the 
inconsistencies it threw up (Kroeker 2015: 49–51). I considered it more hon-
est to account for the gaps and contradictions in my data and to identify how, 
in some parts, my analysis may be speculative rather than interpretative, and 
thus opted for the latter. I did so fully aware that ethnographic texts, in gen-
eral, only suggest one amongst many possible interpretations. In this paper, I 
reflect on my experience with dealing with MaMeli’s case: how I moved from 
my field notes, which documented my interactions with MaMeli, her mother-
in-law, a paediatrician, and a midwife, to an interpretation where I extracted 
details and placed the four narrations in a cultural context. I examine how 
my version was at best an approximate reconstruction of the situation. I draw 
on Reyna (2019) who argues that in anthropology there are but ‘approximate 
truths’, each of which has to be based on an explanation. He underscores that 
in the end it is the anthropologist who judges certain explanations to be more 
reliable than alternative ones.
Between 2007 and 2009, I conducted ten months of ethnographic re-
search at Lesotho’s best HIV treatment site, the Mafeteng Government Hos-
pital, located in Mafeteng, a town about eighty kilometres south of Lesotho’s 
capital Maseru. I had set out to study how young women integrate the com-
plex HIV programme to prevent passing on the virus to their babies. Lesotho 
was one of the countries suffering heavily under HIV/AIDS. At the time its 
HIV rate stood at 25% of those in the reproductive age range and the rate 
amongst pregnant women was even higher, at around 28% (ICAP 2009). HIV 
can be transmitted from mother to child in utero, during delivery, or through 
breastfeeding. Compliance with medical protocols allows significant reduc-
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tion in HIV transmission from mother to child and promises a healthy life. 
Still, I had prepared myself for having to deal with cases of maternal and 
infant death.
During the first phase of research, I accompanied medical staff at the 
hospital, a facility that provides an excellent infrastructure for women dur-
ing pregnancy and labour. I was able to observe and participate in the prac-
tices of antenatal care and HIV counselling. In the second phase, I identified 
thirty pregnant HIV-positive women who allowed me to accompany them to 
their antenatal appointments, visit them at home, meet their relatives, and 
engage with them in interviews, informal conversations, and through par-
ticipant observation. One of the women I met was MaMeli, 19 years old and 
pregnant for the first time. MaMeli had completed Form B (Grade 11) and, for 
the last term of her pregnancy, was staying with her mother in a better-off 
neighbourhood of urban Mafeteng. During visits, I could feel the tensions 
between her mother, her mother-in-law, and MaMeli. Her mother would have 
preferred MaMeli to continue her schooling instead of getting pregnant from 
a much older man, a mine worker and the son of a neighbour. Because her 
mother did not agree to the liaison, MaMeli seemed to struggle more with 
her social situation rather than her medical condition – at least that was my 
perception. Medically, MaMeli’s pregnancy was without complications and 
she was an understanding and informed client in antenatal counselling ses-
sions. However, I began to perceive problems once the baby was delivered 
and passed away a day later. In an attempt to reconstruct the hours between 
the baby’s birth and its death, I interviewed the young mother, her mother-in-
law, the midwife, and the paediatrician who attended to the baby in its severe 
condition, but their stories differed so significantly that it was just impossible 
to discern with any conclusiveness what had happened to the baby and the 
reason for its death. Emotionally, I felt with the family, mourning the loss of a 
child; academically, I was puzzled by their narratives. MaMeli’s case was one 
of those in my ethnographic sample that raised a whole set of methodological 
and analytical challenges as well as possibilities. The deliberations around 
the baby’s death revealed etiquettes, tensions, and social roles that allowed 
important insights in the social drama.
The paper opens with a presentation of the four varying narratives of 
the birth and death of MaMeli’s baby. The rest of the paper then examines 
how I wrote my ethnographic account of the event for an academic and eth-
nographically-trained audience. I do so in four steps: I discuss why inform-
ants tell contradicting versions of the same story, delve into the theory of 
storytelling, briefly examine the issue of lying, and examine the hegemony 
of interpretation. I argue that ethnographic writing is not necessarily about 




Four stories with factual conflicts
It was after Christmas when my research assistant MaKhotso and I checked 
the delivery record at Mafeteng Government Hospital’s maternity ward. Usu-
ally we passed by the maternity ward and the post-natal room every morning 
to see whether any of the thirty women participating in my study had arrived 
to deliver their babies. Because of the Christmas break, we had not been in 
for a couple of days. Noting from the delivery record that MaMeli had deliv-
ered a healthy boy and already left the hospital a few days ago, we decided to 
pay her a visit at home.
In Lesotho, first-time mothers and their babies normally stay at the 
mother’s maternal home, not with their in-laws at the marital homestead.1 
We were surprised, however, to find MaMeli at her in-law’s place. When we 
entered, she was sitting on the floor dressed with a white headscarf, a gar-
ment marking that she was in mourning. We greeted MaMeli but were un-
able to talk to her in private because her mother-in-law came into the room 
with us. The mother-in-law told us that the baby had passed away the day 
after the delivery. In the presence of MaMeli, the elderly woman harshly de-
scribed what had happened. I summarise her account from my field notes 
that I made on the same day2:
MaMeli’s baby passed away the day after she gave birth. After 
the delivery, the baby dropped out of the midwife’s hands whilst 
a nurse was sewing the episiotomy. This fractured the head of 
the child, the mother-in-law claimed. The staff did not treat Ma-
Meli, the baby, and the mother-in-law nicely at all. The nurse 
spoke in a rather rude way to her. She and MaMeli even over-
heard the nurses complaining that the in-laws were visiting too 
often and interrupted them in their duties.3 When the midwife 
discharged MaMeli and the baby from the hospital, MaMeli was 
told to come back for a check-up in two days.
1 The movement between households is linked to the rites of passage a woman 
undergoes with marriage. First-time mothers in particular go to their ma-
ternal homestead during the last trimester of pregnancy until three to four 
months after confinement. In this liminal phase, they are fully catered for 
by their own kin (Ashton 1952: 30; Kroeker 2015: 106–107). The movement 
between households sometimes interrupts the HIV prevention programmes 
the mothers are following.
2 See also Kroeker (2015: 49–51). I also carefully noted the mother-in-law’s 
non-verbal expressions and any other observations I made during the event, 
as suggested by Girtler (2001: 141–143). Immediately after the meeting, I sat 
down with MaKhotso to recapitulate and complete the notes.
3 Relatives are not tolerated in the delivery room and the nurses and midwives 
strictly send them to wait outside the ward. Relatives are, however, allowed in 
the postnatal room. I doubt that the mother-in-law had been present during 
the delivery as she makes us believe.
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But, the mother-in-law asked, turning to MaKhotso and me, 
was it usual for a baby to be brought in for a check-up after 
two days already? When I answered, ‘No, it is usually after one 
week’,4 she exclaimed that this proved that the nurse knew some-
thing was wrong with the baby but kept them in the dark. But 
MaMeli took the baby to the hospital again the very next day. 
The baby was bleeding from the nose. And the mother-in-law 
claimed that this must have been caused by its deformed head. 
The doctor examined the baby, wrote something in a book, tore 
out the page, and sent it to maternity ward, the mother-in-law 
recalled. He also immediately sent a call to the midwife who had 
delivered MaMeli’s baby and who was again on duty. When the 
doctor asked the midwife about what had happened to the child, 
she did not say anything and just kept quiet.
The mother-in-law strongly expressed her dissatisfaction with the nurse 
and claimed the staff behaved in a careless and rude manner in front of 
mother, child, and mother-in-law. Based on that experience, she argued, Ma-
Meli should rather deliver her next baby at home.5 Shocked to hear about the 
baby’s death and the bad service MaMeli had received at the delivery ward, 
MaKhotso and I promised to investigate the case. Thus, on the following day, 
when the paediatrician who had attended to MaMeli’s baby was on duty, I ap-
proached him to ask whether and what he remembered about MaMeli’s case. 
He recalled having attended to her and her baby when MaMeli brought baby 
to the hospital one day after being discharged. The paediatrician gave me this 
account:
MaMeli arrived after 7 p.m. when he was on call for the night 
shift. The mother-in-law dropped in later and immediately start-
ed to talk angrily. She blamed the midwife for having dropped 
the child, arguing that this had resulted in the baby’s malformed 
head. She claimed the bleeding was a consequence of a head 
fracture for which the midwife was responsible.
When he checked the baby, he noticed that the baby was bleed-
ing from the nose, but it was not severe. He asked when the ba-
by’s condition started, but the mother-in-law was unable to an-
swer. He figured that the mother-in-law was not with the child 
during the night and asked her, ‘Who is the mother of this baby?’ 
upon which the mother-in-law pointed to MaMeli. The doctor 
4 I was here referring to the check-up one week after birth as stipulated by 
the 2009 medical protocol for the prevention of mother-to-child transmis-
sion of HIV.




interrogated MaMeli and she explained that the baby had been 
crying all day starting from 8 a.m. He told them that they had 
come too late. The baby had a neonatal sepsis, which he could 
have treated if they had come earlier. He added that traditional 
people often apply Vaseline or cow dung to the umbilical cord, 
which causes infections of the blood cycle.6
I then looked for the midwife who had delivered the baby, and she told me:
The doctor [paediatrician] only called her when the baby had 
already passed away. She remembers the baby’s fontanelle had 
not been closed, but a malformed head is not unusual with new-
borns. Because the Apgar score7 had been low, they had kept 
MaMeli and the baby in hospital for two days before sending 
them home. When the paediatrician called her [when MaMeli 
brought the baby back to hospital], she was surprised to find out 
that this baby, whom she remembered as having been big and 
healthy upon discharge, had passed away. The midwife suspect-
ed that the baby could have died of an undetected heart or lung 
problem.
With that information, I asked MaKhotso to accompany me back to Ma-
Meli. This time, we met her alone. MaMeli, in the absence of her mother-in-
law, gave us a slightly different version of events:
MaMeli already realised in the postnatal room that her baby 
was unwell. When I asked her what symptoms led her to think 
this, she mentioned the deformed head, which her mother-in-
law had interpreted as caused by a fracture. MaMeli stated, 
however, that the nurse had told her that ‘the baby won’t have a 
problem with the head’. She also noted that the baby was crying 
a lot whilst all other babies in the postnatal room were quiet. 
The other mothers in the postnatal room told her that she must 
have lived in a noisy place during her pregnancy to have a baby 
that was crying so much. MaMeli recalled thinking that the baby 
may calm down at home, but the crying got even worse.
When they were discharged, MaMeli spent the first night at her 
mother’s rural home some forty kilometres away from hospital. 
The baby cried all night long and had hot flushes, like a high 
fever. It was also having trouble breathing. She called her sis-
ter-in-law to accompany her to the hospital in the evening. The 
6 I have been unable to find any further indication of such traditional practices 
in the literature or on the ground. The paediatrician was not of local origin 
and did not have children himself.
7 The Apgar score is a method to quickly appraise the health of a newborn baby.
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mother-in-law joined them at the hospital. By this point the baby 
had a severe nosebleed and, when they undressed the baby upon 
arrival at the maternity ward, they realised that the insides of 
its clothes were all bloody. Mother and child were then referred 
to casualty, where they were attended to by the paediatrician.
The four perspectives show some overlaps but also contain some di-
verging interpretations that left me puzzled. Whilst the baseline of the story 
became clear, the versions did not seem to fit together and there was little 
chance for me to get the full picture. Who was present when? What time was 
the baby delivered, when were mother and child discharged, and when did 
they return to the hospital? When did baby die and was its death caused by 
a fractured head, a neonatal sepsis, or some cardiovascular problem? Why 
did MaMeli let her mother-in-law tell the story to the paediatrician and to us, 
when the mother-in-law was not even present during delivery or at discharge, 
or when MaMeli went back to hospital with the baby? Who rewrote, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, the story and why?
I tried to reconstruct the scene and looked for any information that 
would allow me to consolidate the versions. I learnt through participant ob-
servation that the paediatrician habitually blamed ‘those traditional people’ 
and was easily annoyed by relatives of patients who ‘bothered’ medical staff. 
I also found out that MaMeli had been all by herself the night after the de-
livery. Indeed, I established that MaMeli had no experienced women around 
her who could have assisted her in the first hours with her baby and who 
could have noted much more quickly that something was severely wrong: her 
mother was unable to be there because she was working night shift at a tex-
tile factory; and her mother-in-law had only the previous day returned from 
a six-month training period as a traditional healer. The hospital delivery re-
cord was incomplete yet attested that no abnormalities were detected dur-
ing or after childbirth. The delivery had been without complications and the 
baby’s Apgar-score high (contrary to what the midwife had indicated). Even 
MaMeli’s medical booklet and the baby’s health record gave no indication 
that mother or child were advised to stay in hospital for medical treatment 
or observation. And, in contrast to the mother-in-law’s claim, the booklet 
and health record both indicated that mother and child should come back 
after seven days for the baby’s first check-up. There was no record at all that 
a visit of the clinic was recommended two days after discharge. From the 
hospital practices I learnt that relatives are in fact not allowed in the deliv-
ery room, and yet the mother-in-law claimed to know that the midwife had 
dropped the baby in this room shortly after birth whilst a nurse was sewing 
the episiotomy. And despite knowing the situation best, as the only person 
who had been present at all times, MaMeli did not make any effort to correct 
inconsistencies in the storytelling; nor did the midwife add any clarifying 
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information. In fact, I had the suspicion that the midwife was confusing the 
case with another one altogether.
Generally I took the approach during fieldwork to believe the key in-
formant’s version, for the sake of our further collaboration. In MaMeli’s case, 
however, I gave up on finding reliable information and concluded that the 
details I gathered were selective and reductive. This threw a shadow over the 
reliability of the information I had gathered earlier about MaMeli. Speaking 
to her relatives revealed that she had indeed lied to me about her marital 
status. MaMeli had told me she was married whilst the wedding had only 
taken place upon the mother-in-law’s return to town. I concluded that she 
was likely an unreliable informant. At this point I had to decide that MaMeli’s 
case contained little information about the HIV prevention programme I was 
examining and so completed my research without seeing MaMeli again. Yet, 
when I now engaged with my other informants, I began to wonder about the 
truthfulness of the information they gave me. This reflection on methodo-
logical limitations led to me dedicating a complete chapter of my dissertation 
to the topic. I took MaMeli to showcase that there is always uncertainty in 
research and there can be situations where it is impossible to believe a story 
one did not witness oneself. How can one tell facts from fiction?8 Is it my job 
as anthropologist to do so? Would I turn fiction into claims of fact for the in-
sight of my readership, to make a story compelling and real (Fine 1993: 277)? 
Would it not be more plausible for my ethnographic writing to state that in-
formants at times err, lie, or manipulate? Do I have the authority to tell what 
version is wrong? And what is my role in writing that story down?
Writing an ethnographic version of MaMeli’s story
The bottom line is that I was not able to reconstruct exactly how and why 
MaMeli’s baby had died, but the case was nevertheless an eye opener for me 
as ethnographer. I now turn to discuss how inconclusive stories such as this 
one have informed my ethnographic writing and how and why it is possible to 
produce ethnographic knowledge from unreliable data. My knowledge pro-
duction follows the postmodernist notion that there is no factual and correct 
truth but a multiplicity of equally valuable interpretations. Such interpre-
tations relate closely to the narrator’s knowledge embedded in a respective 
‘frame of reference’. In an analysis of global and local knowledge systems, 
Loimeier and his colleagues (2005: 12) defined a frame of reference as
8 I follow Hastrup (2004) in understanding ‘facts’ as information that is or-
ganised as undeniable, general knowledge. Whilst facts are generally agreed 
upon, there may be different interpretations on whether a certain fact an-
swers a particular question. Only in the service of a claim or a question do 
facts become significant.
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the standards of evaluation and orientation which can be ap-
plied by actors in a specific situation and which make funda-
mental statements about the actual and ideal nature of the 
world. Reality is interpreted with the help of and within central 
frames of reference. 
Barth (2002: 3) identified three aspects of knowledge. Like Loimeier 
and his colleagues, he rejects that knowledge is an object or that there is such 
a thing as objective knowledge; rather people host a ‘corpus of substantive as-
sertions’, based on experience, embodied knowledge, and inferences. Second, 
knowledge is instantiated as words, symbols, or performative actions. Third, 
knowledge is dissemination in social interaction, which means that knowl-
edge production takes place during an exchange. In MaMeli’s case, knowl-
edge production happens at the various meetings, with MaMeli, her moth-
er-in-law, the midwife, and the paediatrician staging their perfor mances. 
Yet knowledge production takes place not only in the field but also in the 
engagement of me, as ethnographer, with you, my readers. Hastrup (2004: 
465) rightly notes that ‘the anthropologist in the field engages the world as a 
“double agent”, being both a trained researcher and a character in the local 
drama’. Knowledge is produced in relation to an audience, which in my case 
is an imagined, invisible community of readers. The anthropologist has the 
authority to select and arrange the information and gather it as a text, for the 
end of providing a meaningful and convincing statement. Given this selec-
tion and interpretation of data, it is not the empirical material that counts but 
rather the art of making the interpretation convince a (present or imagined) 
audience. It needs to be noted that scientific knowledge often claims to be the 
dominant frame of reference, and yet, as Neubert and Macamo (2005: 246) 
state, ‘scientific knowledge only represents one of several possible frames of 
reference and is therefore the result of interactions, and is historically spe-
cific, culture-bound, and not value-neutral’ (my translation). Following this 
premise of the sociology of knowledge, I now offer my own writing of MaMe-
li’s case from an anthropological frame of reference. Whilst one could argue 
that, by presenting my version, I intentionally or unintentionally claim that 
my version trumps all others, I rather consider my version as entering into 
a dispute over the ‘hegemony of interpretation’ (Neubert and Macamo 2005: 
254) with the four narratives presented above. I present my version in three 
steps, first by looking at why stories matter, then by examining biographic 
illusions and, lastly, by analysing the link between power and authoritative 
knowledge.
The narrators err but their stories matter
In my version of the story, the four narrators embellish some parts of the 
story and conceal others. They interpret what they know about what hap-
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pened in the few hours between the birth and death of the baby in line with 
their frame of reference and their audience. Their versions are marked by 
significant differences, suggesting intentional or unintentional acts of err-
ing, manipulation, or lying. Often ethnographers will sift out indications of 
such glaring inconsistencies, something I first intended to do. But van der 
Geest offers an explanation of lying that allows a deeper understanding: he 
argues that lying is a way of keeping face. He takes an obvious lie as indica-
tor that he has touched a sensitive issue, with the false information point-
ing to the relevance of the hidden information (van der Geest 2018; see also 
Salamone 1977). Van der Geest argues that hiding information in a public 
conversation shows demeanour and respect, and helps people defend each 
other’s respectability. Based on Erving Goffman’s concept of ‘face’, van der 
Geest shows that lying is sometimes the most respectful and tactful way of 
evading having to give difficult answers. Passin (1942: 235) also sees pos-
sibilities for using field notes that contain obvious lies: ‘it is possible to use 
lies very profitably as field-data, in some cases even more significantly than 
truthful statements’. Salamone draws out that ‘lying is a form of communica-
tion, not its negation’ and that anthropological investigations ‘can lead to the 
discovery of cultural values, dynamic aspects of social organisation and the 
informal structure of networks’ (Salamone 1977: 120, 117). And despite the 
methodological problems that lies pose in the field, McGranahan (2017: 247) 
sees the following potential:
Witnessing [lies] is to see and experience from the inside of 
a community, to gain an experiential sense of its logics and 
rhythms, and to be able to mark and explain how truths and 
fears and lies combine to eliminate certain histories in favour of 
felt or desired beliefs.
The authors argue that whilst checking information might prove that 
an informant has lied, it does not answer the question as to why the person 
has lied and in what forms of social relation the person is embedded. Revis-
iting my field notes I found that keeping ‘face’ was crucial for young urban 
women in Lesotho, particularly in their interactions with men, elders, and in 
other hierarchical social relations like with medical staff. Many young wom-
en intended to show their compliance with behavioural protocols and tried 
to avoid open disputes; they would rather lie, manipulate the expected out-
come of a process, or simply abscond.9 If an informant was trapped between 
candour and seemliness, seemliness was often favoured, argued Goffmann 
(1963: 75), and my observations support his statement.
To gain some understanding as to whether MaMeli, her mother-in-law, 
the paediatrician, and the midwife lied intentionally (also see Luncă, this 
9 I elaborate on these modes of dealing with conflict in asymmetrical social 
relations in Kroeker (2014).
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issue), we need to place MaMeli’s case into the social context of premarital 
relationships in Lesotho. Earlier studies show that Basotho people generally 
discourage premarital sexual relationships and rather encourage early mar-
riage (Maqutu 2005: 36), although secret premarital relationships must be 
considered the norm rather than the exception. This is even more so the case 
in times of HIV/AIDS. However, if a relationship became known, parents 
(and specifically parents of girls) were blamed for the lax moral upbringing of 
their offspring or their lack of supervision. Parents, therefore, tried to avoid 
this stigma from their neighbours. In cases where a relationship was kept 
out of the public eye and did not have any consequences such as a pregnancy, 
many parents would turn a blind eye (see also Bochow 2007). But if a preg-
nancy became visible, the parents of the girl would certainly demand to know 
who had impregnated their daughter. To avoid a loss of face if the daughter 
were labelled lose or spoilt, parents often felt compelled to marry off their 
daughters to the father of the child (Kroeker 2015: 92; Maqutu 2005: 152, 
155): a child born out of wedlock would serve as a constant public reminder 
that ‘something is wrong with the mother of this child’ (Ashton 1952: 33), 
and the bad name given to the child would serve as a continuous lesson to the 
mother (Kroeker 2015: 87).
MaMeli had told me, in light of her parents’ reluctance to accept her 
relationship with their neighbour’s son, she had planned her pregnancy in 
order to speed up the process of marriage negotiations. Thus, expecting the 
wedding to ensue in due course and in light of the moral stigma accorded to 
unmarried mothers, MaMeli already began to call the father of her unborn 
child her husband. She considered herself already ‘as if’ married and thus 
avoided scrutiny from medical counsellors and relatives about her premari-
tal sex life. To me, it looked like a lie meant to conceal that the baby was born 
out of wedlock. But when I compared my field notes on MaMeli with those 
on other young women, I realised that the avoidance of disputes and the at-
tempt to solve conflict non-verbally was a strategy they all tended to use. For 
instance, out of respect MaMeli avoided a discussion of her HIV status and 
used a strategy of indirect disclosure instead. It would have been a dishonour 
to explain to her mother or her mother-in-law her amorous relation, premari-
tal sex, and how this led to her infection with HIV, about which she had learnt 
in antenatal care. Instead, as MaMeli told me, she left her medical booklet 
lying around, expecting that her mother would look at it and thus find out 
about her medical condition ‘by surprise’. Like this she disclosed her HIV 
status without having to talk about it.
Taking such social constellations into consideration, I argue that Ma-
Meli gave false information in order to keep face. But not only did MaMeli 
manipulate her story. It seems that all narrators tried in one way or another 
to keep face and to make their story more meaningful. I explore one form in 




Besides the desire of keeping ‘face’, the narrators were driven to tell their 
specific stories due to a ‘biographic illusion’. This term refers to a sociologi-
cal debate that discusses whether a ‘good story’ is necessarily a ‘true story’ 
(Apitzsch and Jansen 2003: 195–110). When analysing situations and infor-
mation, we need to remain aware that experiences are not told the same way 
they took place: narrations rather depend on the narrator’s current state of 
mind, the situation in which they are told, and the way in which memories 
develop over time. As memory fades, the narrator fills in gaps, and as re-
cipients express comprehension (or incomprehension) of a story, the narrator 
adjusts. Interactions, therefore, already imply an analysis of the past in the 
way the stories are narrated. In general, a narration draws on two aspects: 
the situation as experienced (erzählte Zeit) and the present situation (Er-
zählzeit), the perspective through which the past is interpreted (Lucius-Hoe-
ne and Deppermann 2002: 24–29). As Apitzsch and Jansen (2003) show, au-
tobiographic narrations may not necessarily match an objective description. 
A narrator may, with or without the intention of faking a story, consider other 
parts and explanations more important than the listener. Occurrences that 
would be of importance for explaining the self of that past time might not 
be considered relevant when narrating what had happened in the present. 
Information might have faded or might not be worth telling due to different 
assumptions of the topic under study, by the informant and by me, the recipi-
ent. Ochs and Capps (2001: 45) warn that researchers need to bear in mind 
that ‘narratives of personal experience do not present objective, comprehen-
sive accounts of events but rather perspectives on events. [ . . . They must be 
considered] as selections rather than as reflections of reality’. Details will be 
generalised, selected, or completely neglected if they did not seem valuable 
for the core of the story. Hence, a narrative may become an illusion that is 
enshrined in the telling of the occurrence rather than the memory of the oc-
currence itself. Besides the inability to memorise and narrate occurrences 
accurately, a narration conveys a message to the audience and aims to ‘con-
struct an over-arching storyline’ that embellishes the narrator’s presentation 
of the self (Ochs and Capps 2001: 4).10
When we apply this to MaMeli’s case, we see that MaMeli and the other 
speakers reinterpreted the events and, in the narratives presented to MaK-
hotso and me, each focused on blaming another, absent person. Whilst the 
mother-in-law placed the emphasis on the midwife’s bad medical and social 
skills, the doctor blamed the mother’s ignorance and ‘those traditional peo-
10 Ochs and Capps (2001: 4) note: ‘All narratives exhibit tension between the 
desire to construct an over-arching storyline that ties events together in a 
seamless explanatory framework and the desire to capture the complexities of 
the events experienced, including haphazard details, uncertainties, and con-
flicting sensibilities among protagonists’.
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ple’. The midwife found the reasons for the baby’s sudden death in the medi-
cal realm, but one unrelated to her expertise and practice. MaMeli indirectly 
blamed the other mothers in the postnatal room for accusing her of having 
stayed in noisy places during her pregnancy and for advising her to go home 
and calm down the baby. The narratives already entailed foreshadowing and 
back shadowing which hinted at what the narrators aimed to convey (Ochs 
and Capps 2001: 5). With this technique the narrators already forecast their 
point of blaming someone else and justified their own actions.
In summary, the performative act of telling a story entails information 
about the social constellation of narrator and listeners that is crucial for an 
anthropological analysis. However, the actual happenings move to the back-
ground, as they can hardly be reconstructed retrospectively.
Power and authoritative knowledge
One line from an ethnography of childbirth struck me and made me once 
more revisit MaMeli’s case in the process of writing my thesis. The line read: 
‘the power of authoritative knowledge is not that it is correct, but that it 
counts’ (Jordan 1997: 56). This raises two questions: how did the narrators in 
MaMeli’s case make their stories count? What authority could they draw on 
to make their versions gain value?
MaMeli, the only person who had attended to her baby in its first and 
last hours, kept silent (and ‘saved face’, for that matter) whilst her mother-in-
law talked to the doctor and, again, when telling the story to MaKhotso and 
me. Obviously MaMeli had her reasons: she had the knowledge to answer the 
questions, but she lacked authority to make her version be heard. Revisiting 
my field notes and interview transcripts opened my eyes and broadened my 
perspective on the rest of my data.
Within the biomedical frame of reference, patients speak frankly and 
openly about their complaints. From the perspective of health policy mak-
ers, patients are democratic and self-determined individuals who are able to 
make informed decisions over their bodies and do not need to consult family 
members for this. This position explains why the paediatrician wanted to 
know who the mother of the baby was and gave MaMeli the opportunity to tell 
her version of the happenings. From the perspective of the patients, the situ-
ation looks quite different. The medicalisation of health gives privileges over 
the patient’s body to experts and their machines and thus disenfranchises 
the patient. Biomedical staff thus gain strength and decisive power over cli-
ents with the help of scientific ‘evidence-based’ operations. Women and their 
reproductive health are a particularly heavily medicalised field (Jordan 1997; 
Davis-Floyd and Sargent 1997). Medical technology ‘exalts practitioner over 
patient in a status hierarchy that attributes authoritative knowledge only to 
those who know how to manipulate the technology and decode the informa-
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tion it provides’ (Davis-Floyd and Sargent 1997: 8). The relation between staff 
and patient in biomedical facilities is based on professional distance and au-
thority (Jordan 1997: 70). This dual perspective on hierarchies explains why 
MaMeli was unable to speak openly to the doctor; neither could the midwife 
speak openly in the presence of her patient when the doctor called her in. 
Otherwise the midwife would have lost face.
In addition, childbirth is a contested field. Power relations within the 
medical realm are no less restrictive than systems of kinship and familial 
interdependence. Anthropologist and midwife Brigitte Jordan argues in her 
book Birth in Four Cultures (1993) that familial systems claim hierarchies 
of age, respect, and decision-making power over young and inexperienced 
mothers. Mothers-in-law in many cases take care of a newborn and thus make 
decisions in the mother’s stead as part of their care obligations for mother 
and child. Elder women have a profound effect on decision-making during 
pregnancy, delivery, new motherhood, and childcare, which means that new 
mothers need to accept subordination to and advice from their female el-
ders (such as mothers or mothers-in-law) for the sake of the well-being of 
the family. Jordan argues that certain aspects in the discourse on the ‘right’ 
behaviour in pregnancy, delivery, and childcare gain value, which qualifies a 
statement as decisive and authoritative, even if the young mother may have 
alternative opinions or feelings. The expecting or new mother needs to bal-
ance conflicting opinions against each other in relation to the speaker:
The central observation is that for any particular domain sever-
al knowledge systems exist, some of which, by consensus, come 
to carry more weight than others, either because they explain 
the state of the world better for the purposes at hand (efficacy) or 
because they are associated with a stronger power base (struc-
tural superiority), and usually both. (Jordan 1997: 56)
Sich (1983: 21–40) argues that even in situations where a young mother 
might have contrasting information at hand, she is likely to comply with the 
recommended behaviour of authorities, despite better knowledge. She argues 
that in this way the young person lets the elder keep honour and save face. 
Scott (1990: 82–83) explains that such gerontocratic orders are very stable 
since young people expect in time to achieve a similar powerful position for 
themselves. Expecting in future to become a respected parent allows young 
women to accept a subordinated role and compliance with authoritative or-
ders in the present. Gerontocratic dominance and subordination seem, thus, 
a matter of being and becoming. Thus, in generational debates youngsters 
comply with directives for the sake of showing respect and honour to their el-
ders. Such respect for elders is an integral part of many African societies and 
younger people avoid openly questioning the advice of elders as this would 
be seen as disrespectful and offensive. This explains why MaMeli would not 
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speak up in front of her mother-in-law and the doctor and why she allowed 
her mother-in-law to tell her misstatements.
Despite this authoritative setting, I found the young mothers to be ac-
tors in their own right. Eager to avoid conflict, they found creative ways to 
solve problems (see also Kroeker 2014), for instance by involving another 
person. Such a person would hold legitimacy through access to one or more 
of the following resources: money, social status, the control over supernatu-
ral forces (Eckert 2004: 20), authority of age (as in the case of Lesotho), or 
the backing from a domineering medical system. Goffman (1963: 28, 31) calls 
such an ambassador ‘the wise’ and uses this term to refer to a person who 
knows about a stigmatised identity, but one in the face of whom the indi-
vidual affected does not feel shame or the need to hide the stigma. Involving 
an ambassador is a usual strategy of conflict resolution in Basotho culture, 
one which is institutionalised and non-violent. It is likely that MaMeli put her 
mother-in-law in this position to explain to the doctor what had happened to 
her baby. This would explain why the mother-in-law, who had not witnessed 
the events, dared to enter into a discussion with the doctor and the midwife 
on behalf of MaMeli. Her authoritative position made it legitimate for her to 
act as ambassador.
This brings me to my own role in the set-up of my study: as study par-
ticipants gained trust and confidence in MaKhotso and me, they began to ask 
us to step in as ambassadors to assist them. They expected us to be knowl-
edgeable as well as convincing. We had observed their family situations and 
knew a great deal about the relationships and conflicts present. Often we 
already knew some of the household members through our home visits and 
interviews. The informants had taken our conversations as a chance to air 
unresolved life events, particularly generational and marital conflicts (see 
also Ochs and Capps 2001: 7). Indeed, some even approached me directly 
to take on the role of ambassador, as I had researched their stories and they 
felt I could therefore speak to third parties on their behalf. At first I did not 
consider this role as an opportunity for participant observation; actually, I 
did not like to become an ambassador and avoided this role as far as possible. 
Taking on such a role in a situation of conflict seemed to me to be a form of 
undue interference in the lives of my research participants and thus a hin-
drance to my study. It was only when I analysed my field notes that I started 
to appreciate the value the position holds. As a social function, the role of am-
bassador between generations incorporated me into the local structures of 
conflict management; it also allocated to me a set of rights and duties. It was 
when I took on the role despite my earlier hesitation that I began to recognise 
the social positions and hierarchies that were underlying the social relation-
ships. It is thus in hindsight that my involvement at the request of informants 
can be characterised as active participant observation (Girtler 2001: 63). In 
MaMeli’s case, however, I had missed that opportunity.
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It was with the literature on face saving, biographic illusion and the power 
of authoritative knowledge that I finally sat down to write. Some parts of 
MaMeli’s story began to make sense when read through the lens of this litera-
ture, though others remained unclear. Going back and forth between the lit-
erature and the field notes helped me cross-check and identify certain gaps, 
though some might also have been the result of imprecise note taking on my 
part. I was unable to fill the gaps of knowledge fully, though I noted that these 
gaps become more visible and defined: what conclusions can I draw? What 
knowledge did I produce? What is it that I do not know?
I the fifth version of the story, my own, MaMeli is troubled by conflict-
ing demands. An analysis of the narrations indicated that her social role was 
one of a minor towards her mother-in-law and within the medical realm. I 
assume that MaMeli was neither in a position to confront the paediatrician 
nor her mother-in-law and that her inability was not only due to the trauma 
she had just experienced but lay in the social structures of power relations. 
These power relations are representative for the frames of reference, all of 
which claimed to explain the happenings around the baby’s death. MaMeli 
actively made room for her preferences whilst acting in a subordinate role 
by using the tools at her disposal. She behaved according to the norms of 
respect for elders and refused to challenge the existing social order when she 
avoided conflicts – by lying about her marriage, leaving her medical booklet 
for her mother find out about her HIV infection, or planning a pregnancy to 
hasten marriage negotiations. I also sensed that she felt insecure at being left 
alone with her baby without the support of experienced women who could 
have told her that newborn babies usually sleep a lot and that she should be 
alarmed by her baby’s incessant crying.
This is as much as I feel comfortable to say that I know. I am sure, how-
ever, that I lack detail on the following: the events in the delivery room; those 
at MaMeli’s home; with whom she interacted; and how the midwife reacted 
to the accusation of having dropped the baby and fractured its skull. There 
is no convincing portrayal of those parts of the story. However, by defining 
my gaps of knowledge in this clear-cut manner, it was easier for me to write 
about what I had learnt, my version, in the name of science, not in the name 
of MaMeli.
Conclusion
Do the stories matter? Yes and no. Taken literally, the different narratives of 
MaMeli’s story were contradictory and confusing and I did not know whom 
to believe. The case challenged me methodologically and analytically. Meth-
odologically, I was unable to verify the information: the happenings around 
the baby’s death were in the past and I had missed the opportunity of estab-
lishing their facticity through first-hand observation (and perhaps to change 
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the course of events) (see Hastrup 2004: 467). Having heard four versions 
of the same story revealed some congruency but also quite a bit of inconsist-
ency, so that the material seemed to be useless to recapture the course of 
events. How was I to bring such diverse accounts into resonance with each 
other? This opened up analytical challenges.
First, the way I tell the story is a fifth version, one that I as anthropolo-
gist and author decided to tell you, my imagined readership. I directed your 
thinking (foreshadowing) by adding my thoughts on approximate recon-
structions, frames of reference, lying, biographic illusions, and authoritative 
knowledge, and posed a line of questions that I am unable to answer. One 
could counter that I did not try hard enough to check the facts that constitute 
the narratives. That is correct: I chose rather to work towards providing a 
plausible explanation for how the individual narrators presented the infor-
mation and their selves.
Second, the material collected on MaMeli entailed a blessing in disguise. 
Revisiting the material in the process of writing, I began to recognise its value. 
Analysing the speech act in the present (Erzählzeit) was more informative for 
my study than what happened in the narrated past (erzählte Zeit). The stories 
had errors and inconsistencies and were manipulative; beyond the surface, 
they were suggestive in regard to culture, power, and conflict. What was said 
and unsaid pointed out the power relations between those who were involved 
in the various situations, including MaKhotso and me. That was the relevant 
data I had at hand. I may have over-interpreted the social relations (who can 
tell for sure?), yet I did so with the best intention and in respect of my theo-
retical and empirical knowledge. In the text, I established that knowledge 
happens in social interactions. My double-agent role as researcher and actor 
in the social drama suggests that I migrated between different social frames 
of reference that allowed me access to knowledge exclusive to me and my aca-
demic audience. Such knowledge was not accessible to MaMeli, her mother-
in-law, or the medical staff. Given this, I saw something in them and in their 
interactions that the interlocutors themselves might not have been aware of. 
This position gave me the authority to present in my version the whole dis-
pute over the hegemony of interpretation, from an apparently more holistic 
point of view that encompassed all other frames of reference. It is from this 
position that I as anthropologist judged certain statements as embellished, 
neglected, selected, authoritative, or silenced and, lastly, saw narrations as 
performative acts of self-representation.
Third, I agree with Piker (2011: 985) that ‘lies reveal deeper truths, ex-
amining the process of constructing and maintaining lies helps us to appre-
ciate the interconnectedness and insecurity of our subjects’. It feels unjust 
to call the four stories lies, and it seems more plausible that informants in-
tentionally or unintentionally interpreted the events in different ways. It is 
not my task as an anthropologist to correct the stories and to make them fit 
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nicely, but it is my task to point to why these contradicting stories matter. If 
different accounts do not fit nicely, I argue it is my task as anthropologist to 
inform my readership accordingly. I second Passin (1942: 246) in his conclu-
sion that ‘it remains for this writer simply a catch-all for such lies as he can-
not now explain, pending their future disposition as a consequence of greater 
knowledge’. Let us be open about the gaps in knowledge and not pretend that 
the answers we find match the questions we posed.
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